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Abstract. The implementation, deployment and testing of secure services for Internet
of Things devices is nowadays still at an early stage. Several frameworks have recently
emerged to help developers realize such services, abstracting the complexity of the many
types of underlying hardware platforms and software libraries. Assessing the performance
and usability of a given framework remains challenging, as they are largely influenced by
the application and workload considered, as well as the target hardware. Since 15 years,
ARM processors are providing support for TRUSTZONE, a set of security instructions that
realize a trusted execution environment inside the processor. OP-TEE is a free-software
framework to implement trusted applications and services for TRUSTZONE. In this short
paper we show how one can leverage OP-TEE for implementing a secure service (i.e.,
a key-value store). We deploy and evaluate the performance of this trusted service on
common Raspberry Pi hardware platforms.
We report our experimental results with the data store and also compare it against
OP-TEE’s built-in secure storage.
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1 Introduction
Despite the availability of security-oriented instruction sets in consumer-grade processors,
high-level frameworks that can help developers use such extensions are still at an early stage.
Moreover, little has been said regarding the performance and usability of these frameworks.
This is unfortunate given that the large majority of devices featuring ARM processors (mobile
and not) feature the TRUSTZONE extensions, introduced since 15 years [1], and are constantly
being improved with new processor revisions. For instance, ARM recently [6] updated its
ARMv8.4 architecture of application processors enabling virtualization in the secure world. The
introduction of virtualization in the secure world better improves the isolation of components
and resources, and it is expected to boost the trusted applications (TA) ecosystem in developing
and using common standards and APIs.
It is only very recently that the first open-source tools aiming to exploit these capabilities
have emerged. Notable examples include Linaro ARM Trusted Firmware [3], ARM GNU
Toolchain [2], Android’s Trusty [13], Trustonic’s Kinibi [21], NVIDIA’s TLK [18] and finally
Linaro’s OP-TEE [17].
A major challenge for developers of trusted applications resides in the complexity of the
secure platforms themselves. Despite the existence of standards and APIs, trusted applications
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Fig. 1: Organization of components within TRUSTZONE and interaction with OP-TEE
remain OS-specific because of the custom libraries provided by the different vendors. Theses
libraries are specialized for the various processors and are required to access secure storage and
processing elements. They rely on drivers shipped with the hardware by the silicon manufacturer.
Furthermore, dispatching trusted OSs requires trusted OS-specific code in the firmware, which
adds up to the issue. This greatly hinders the portability of trusted applications across different
trusted OSs and drives TA developers toward implementing and supporting several versions
of trusted OS-specific TAs.
In this paper, we focus on a specific framework, OP-TEE [17], which has gained much
attraction recently and is arguably the most mature open-source framework for developing
trusted application with ARM’s TRUSTZONE extensions. We describe its architecture and
features, and we evaluate its usability and performance by developing a simple key-value store.
We also execute OP-TEE’s secure storage benchmark and report our results. This preliminary
study bring insights into the benefits of such framework, able to hide the complexity of the
underlying vendor-specific libraries and processor, as well as their performance and overhead.
2 Background
2.1 TrustZone in a Nutshell
The TRUSTZONE technology is available in ARM processors since 2003 [6]. It is a hardware-
enforced mechanism isolating a secure world (trusted) from a normal world (untrusted), which
includes all components within the SoC as well as peripherals. Thus, TRUSTZONE provides
secure endpoints and enables device root-of-trust. Software running in the normal world is unable
to directly access secure components and resources. When booting up a TRUSTZONE-enabled
SoC, secure firmware is the first software component executed at exception level 3 (EL3). The
secure firmware code is responsible for initializing the platform, installing the trusted operating
system (OS) and routing secure monitor calls. The trusted OS consists of a small and secure
kernel to execute trusted applications (TA). Once the secure world is set up, the normal world
OS is booted in parallel to the trusted OS running in the secure world. Worlds can be switched
via a software-based secure monitor (ARMv8-A) or in hardware (ARMv8-M) [5]. The secure
monitor acts as a gateway and runs at the highest privilege level EL3 [4].
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Device QEMU Raspberry
CPU Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6 Broadcom BCM2837
CPU Frequency 3.8GHz 1.2GHz
Memory 63GiB DDR4 944MiB LPDDR2
Memory Frequency 2400MHz 900MHz
Samsung Transcend micro SDHCDisk MZ7KM480HMHQ0D3 UHI-I Premium
Disk Size 480GB 16GB
Disk Read Speed 528.33MB/s 90MB/s
Table 1: Comparison of platforms
2.2 The GlobalPlatform Specifications for TEEs
The main specifications for secure digital services and devices are published by industry
associations [12,20]. In our study, we focus on the GLOBALPLATFORM specifications for
TRUSTZONE. A rich execution environment (REE) is an execution environment that involves
at least one device and all its components or an OS, excluding any trusted or secure component.
In contrast, a trusted execution environment (TEE) provides a level of security to protect against
attacks and secures data access. The TEE executes alongside the REE, but is shielded from it. A
trusted application executes inside a TEE and exposes secure services to applications in the REE.
Trusted storage is a hardware or cryptographically-protected device capable of storing data [11].
Data can be exchanged between an application in the REE and a TA by three types of shared
memory: whole (an entire memory region and is allocated by the TEE), partial (only a a subset
of the wholewith a specified offset), and temporarily, for which a memory buffer region allocate
by the application in the REE temporarily shared with the TA for the duration of the API call [9].
2.3 The OP-TEE Framework
OP-TEE [17] is a TEE implementation of GLOBALPLATFORM specifications on top of TRUST-
ZONE. It can be used alongside a Linux-based distribution running in the REE. TAs are
single-threaded executables stored inside the REE. Users develop TAs without having to re-
compile the entire framework. OP-TEE does not provide mechanisms to verify the integrity
of a TA, and consequently it exposes TAs to the untrusted REE. Upon modification, this can
compromise the integrity or protection of the TEE. Alternatively, TAs can be directly integrated
into OP-TEE as pseudo TAs. Pseudo TAs run inside the OP-TEE OS as secure privileged-level
services without access to GLOBALPLATFORM’s Internal Core API. Thus, pseudo TAs can
only use OP-TEE’s core Internal API.
Secure storage allows applications to offload data from a TA to either the REE file system
or a replay protected memory block (RPMB) partition of an embedded multi-media controller
(eMMC) device using the Internal Core API. By default, the OP-TEE OS is configured to use the
RPMB [16] if available. The secure storage is accessible and visible only to the TA that created it.
3 Usability
The communication between an application in the normal world and a TA evolves around
functions handling the context, session, command and shared memory as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 2: Throughput-latency plots of shared memory types for key-value TA in TEE and REE.
This facilitates interoperability between different GLOBALPLATFORM API compatible TEE
implementations and allows REE applications to set up multiple contexts. A context is initialized
by referencing the device file ¶ connecting to the TEE driver ·. TAs are identified by a
universally unique identifier (UUID), which is referred to when setting up a session to a TA ¸.
To set up a session, OP-TEE will load the TA from the normal world to the secure world with
the help of tee-supplicant ¹. The tee-supplicant is a daemon running in the normal
world used by OP-TEE to request services from the REE. These steps are skipped when a
session to a pseudo TA is established. A TA can initialize and set up its environment upon
TA creation and session establishment (º & »). From this point on, the REE application can
request services from the TA by invoking commands. These commands can pass up to four
parameters, which are either values or references to shared memory regions. Values are pairs of
unsigned 32bit integers. Shared memory regions are allocated, registered and released through
GLOBALPLATFORM API calls in libteec. Without the availability of libteec, developers
would have to communicate directly with the kernel driver through ioctl system calls.
In OP-TEE, TAs can use services accessible through GLOBALPLATFORM Internal Core
API » implemented in libutee. TAs are statically linked against libutee, which wrapps
the API functions around assembler macros to OP-TEE OS system calls. The library provides
interfaces to secure storage ½, time, arithmetic and cryptographic operations ¼. The secure
storage API encrypts data objects by the use of a secure storage service. The encryption process
involves three keys: secure storage key (SSK), trusted application storage key (TSK) and file
encryption key. The SSK is generated from the hardware unique key and is used to derive TSKs.
Each TA has a TSK that is generated from the SSK and the TA’s UUID. Both SSK and TSK are
generated using HMAC SHA256 algorithm [16]. Finally, every created file a FEK is generated
from the pseudo random number generator. The encrypted data objects are then transferred
to the tee-supplicant by a series of remote procedure calls and stored in a special file.
OP-TEE further provides TAs with libraries for TLS and SSL protocols (libmbedtls [7]),
arithmetic (libmpa) and a subset of ISO C functions (libutils). Once the REE application
has no further service requests, the session is terminated and the context is destroyed.
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4 Performance Evaluation
4.1 Setup
The key-value store and OP-TEE’s Sanity Testsuite v3.2.0 [15] were deployed on the two
platforms: Dell PowerEdge R330 Server and Raspberry Pi 3B v1.2. The Dell PowerEdge R330
is running Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS with the 4.15.0-43-generic Linux kernel and is used to emulate
the Raspberry Pi 3B platform with QEMU v2.12.0 [8]. A comparison of the two platforms
can be found in Table 1. OP-TEE provides a build environment which, by default, deploys and
emulates its OS on an ARMVirtual Machine virt using a Cortex-A57 with no more than
two cores. The deployment was changed to match the specification of the Raspberry Pi 3B
platform as close as possible.
4.2 Shared Memory
We have ported a simple key-value store to a TA, in order to evaluate the overhead and per-
formance of different types of shared memory. As basis, we used a modified version of the hash
table implementation of kazlib v1.20 [14], removing support for contexts and dynamic tables.
The hash table is static, uses separate chaining to resolve collisions, applies a modular hashing
and has 251 chains. We time every DEL (delete), GET and PUT operation for each benchmark
by referring to CLOCK MONOTONIC in the REE. Operations are uniformly distributed and issued
256 times at a rate of 1 to 32768 operations per second.
When using whole or partially shared memory, the REE application requests a shared
memory region of 512KiB and fills it with random data from /dev/urandom. Similarly, the
REE application allocates and initializes a 512KiB buffer used as temporarily shared memory.
Before every invocation of a key-value operation, a random offset into the shared memory
region is computed, which is also used as key. A chunk size of 1KiB beginning at the random
offset is used as data object. The PUT benchmark starts with an empty hash table. The DEL
and GET benchmarks start with a pre-populated hash table of 256 data objects. Finally, the
mixed benchmark (ratio of GET and PUT operations) begins with a pre-populated hash table
relative to the percentage of GET operations.
Figure 2 shows throughput and latency for the different shared memory types and for running
the key-value store entirely in the REE. On the QEMU platform, the operations do not separate
as well as on the Raspberry platform; we assume due to reaching an I/O bound. The operations
on the Raspberry platform separate as expected according to their throughput (lowest to highest):
PUT, MIX50, MIX20, GET, and DEL. The overhead of the PUT operation is due to memory
allocation, memory copy and object insertion. The GET operation looks up a data object and
copies it to shared memory, resulting in a lower overhead. The higher the portion of PUT opera-
tions in the MIX benchmarks is, the slower the average operation speed becomes. Thus, MIX50
(50% PUT operations) has a lower average throughput than MIX20. The DEL operation looks
up a data object and frees its memory, avoiding time consuming memory operations. Comparing
TEE throughput against REE throughput yields a 12 to 14× overhead on the QEMU platform
and a 12 to 17× overhead on the Raspberry platform. A similar experiment was conducted
in [19], where they compared the time spend in normal and secure world when invoking a noop
operation.
4.3 Secure Storage
The secure storage benchmark is part of the OP-TEE sanity test suite adhering to the Trusted
Storage API for Data and Keys described in [10]. Neither of the platforms is equipped with
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Fig. 3: Secure storage benchmark execution time and throughput
an eMMC, for which reason the secure storage has to be offloaded to the REE file system. The
benchmark executes three commands WRITE, READ, and REWRITE, for data sizes in the range
of 256B to 1MiB, that are accessed in chunks of at most 1KiB. The REWRITE command first
reads data from an object, resets the cursor and writes the data back to the same object. The data
to be stored in the secure storage is allocated and filled with scrambled data within the TEE.
Figure 3 shows the overhead of accessing data in chunks of 1KiB in the secure storage. In
general, the overhead becomes more significant with increasing data sizes, more precisely once
the data size exceeds the chunk size. Maximum speed is achieved when the data size equals
the chunk size. Overall, the REWRITE command has the highest overhead, because it basically
executes the READ and WRITE commands in one batch.
5 Concluding Remarks
Development of secure services benefits from well established APIs and standards. OP-TEE has
implemented several of GLOBALPLATFORM’s specifications and APIs and provides common
interfaces for secure services. We have ported a simple key-value store to a TA and we have
studied the performance and usability of secure storage and shared memory. The results of
our benchmarks have shown that requesting services from TAs in TRUSTZONE on ARMv8-A
using OP-TEE incurs a significant overhead compared to service execution in the normal world.
Limiting the space available to a TA is sensible, in order to minimize the trusted computing
base. However, the default memory limit of 1MiB for TAs in OP-TEE becomes a major
inconvenience with respect to secure storage and shared memory.
Generating the SSK in OP-TEE requires the HUK. However, most platforms lack of doc-
umentation to access or obtain the HUK. OP-TEE avoids this issue by considering a static string
value instead of the HUK. This alternative can potentially weaken the cryptographic protection
of the objects stored in the REE file system of the secure storage. TEEs would greatly benefit
from unrestricted access to HUKs and could so improve the protection of trusted storage.
We expect the trusted application ecosystem to improve portability of TAs among TEEs.
Furthermore, we hope that our evaluation of usability and performance of TAs provides deeper
insight into future development of trusted services.
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